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                                                           Abstract 
              Diversified business groups are well-known phenomenon in emerging markets, both 
today and historically. This is often explained by the prevalence of institutional voids or the 
nature of government-business relations. It is typically assumed that  such groups were much less 
common in developed economies, and largely disappeared during the twentieth century. This 
working paper contests this assumption with evidence from Britain between 1850 and the present 
day. During the nineteenth century merchant houses established business groups with diversified 
portfolio and pyramidal structures overseas, primarily in developing countries, both colonial and 
independent. In the domestic economy, large single product firms became the norm, which over 
time merged into large combines with significant market power. This reflected a business system 
in which a close relationship between finance and industry was discouraged, but were there few 
restrictions on the transfer of corporate ownership. Yet large diversified business groups did 
emerge, which had private or closely held shareholding and substantial international businesses. 
The working paper argues that diversified business groups added value in mature markets such 
as Britain. In the domestic economy, Pearson and Virgin created well-managed and performing 
businesses over long periods. The much-criticized conglomerates of the 1970s-1990s era such as 
Hanson and BTR were also quite financially successful forms of business enterprise. The demise 
of many of them appears to owe at least as much to management fads as to serious financial 
under-performance.       
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Business groups exist in developed markets also: Britain since 18501 
 
1. Introduction 
              Business groups, defined as a constellation of legally-independent companies bound 
together with formal and/or informal ties, are well-known to be a prevalent form of business 
enterprise across much of contemporary Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. (Colpan, 
Hikino, and Lincoln, 2010). A body of competing theories has developed to explain them. 
Market imperfections theory has explained them as responses to the institutional voids that are 
commonly found in emerging markets. (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) Political scientists have 
emphasized the role of government policies in targeting particular industries and sectors, and 
giving special privileges to selected business group. (Schneider, 2010) An emerging body of 
literature employing evolutionary perspectives has identified the role of entrepreneurship (Kock 
and Guillen, 2001, Chung 2006, Jones and Colpan 2016). Business historians have shown that 
the business group form, contrary to early research which related it primarily to the post World 
War 2 era, have demonstrated the business groups became pre-eminent in the second half of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in many non-Western economies, including Argentina, 
                                                            
1 I would like to thank Ann-Kristin Bergquist, David Collis, Asli Colpan, and the  participants at 
a conference on "Business Groups in the West" held in Kyoto on March 8-10 2014, for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this working paper. A version of this working paper will appear in 
Asli Colpan & Takashi Hikino (eds), Business Groups in the West, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming. 
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Chile, India, Japan, Mexico and Turkey. (Tripathi 2004, Jones 2005a, Barbero and Jacob 2008, 
Jones and Lluch 2015,Jones and Colpan 2016).  
                  In contrast, the existence of business groups in the developed West has been much 
less studied, with the conspicuous exception of Sweden, where diversified business groups such 
as the one owned by the Wallenberg family have been highly influential for over a century. 
(Glete 1994, Lindgren 1994, Iversen and Larsson, 2011) Business groups used to play no role in 
the standard accounts of the business history of Britain. In the classic story told by Alfred D. 
Chandler (and many others), the United States raced ahead of Britain as the world’s largest 
economy in the late nineteenth century because it created large industrial corporations which 
separated ownership from control, created managerial hierarchies and eventually the M-form, 
and undertook the necessary investments in the new capital-intensive investments of second 
industrial revolution such as machinery and chemicals. The British, in contrast, remained 
committed to family ownership and management, which preferred short-term income to long-
term growth in assets, and had a bias for small-scale operations which contributed to failures to 
invest and modernize. Consequently, the British economy was seen as “failing.” The major 
research question was why Britain did not follow the American path of creating big firms with 
professional managers which was assumed to be the “one best way.” (Chandler, 1990; Elbaum 
and Lazonick, 1987; Hannah, 1976).  
Today little remains of this interpretation. The United States had higher productivity than 
Britain (or anywhere else) by the mid-nineteenth century, for reasons other than business 
structures, while Britain had a clear productivity lead over its European counterparts until the 
1950s, and again between the 1980s and the 2000s. Nor would many scholars now view family 
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ownership as inherently inferior to professional management. There appears to be no correlation 
between the adoption of US-style managerial hierarchies and productivity performance in the 
interwar years. (Jones 1997, Broadberry and Crafts 1992)  
           In any case, revisionist research has now suggested that it was the United States rather 
than Britain that large industrial corporations clung to family business. In 1900, according to 
Hannah, it was US business corporations where were dominated by plutocratic family owners, 
while British quoted companies showed higher levels of divorce of shareholding owners from 
management controllers (Hannah, 2007). In 2012 Foreman-Peck and Hannah showed that the 
divorce of ownership and control in British public companies was far ahead of any other country, 
and especially the United States. (Foreman-Peck and Hannah, 2012). 
          During the interwar years, and again during the 1960s, there were major merger waves in 
British industry. By 1958 the share of the 100 largest enterprises in manufacturing net output was 
higher in Britain than in the United States (32 versus 30 per cent). By 1970 Britain was far more 
concentrated by this measure than the United States (41 versus 33 per cent). By that year the M-
form was also almost as widespread as in the United States (Jones 1997; Whittington and Mayer 
2000). Although the 1970s saw a period of structural dislocation, as major industries such as 
automobile manufacturing experienced major crises, subsequently there was a major renaissance 
of British business and the British economy, based fundamentally on an embrace of globalization 
and a strong shift from manufacturing to higher value-added services. (Owen, 2009). It was only 
during and after the global financial crisis beginning in 2008, which adversely affected an 
economy which was extremely exposed to global financial flows, that some downsides of this 
shift were observed. Certainly the British-owned manufacturing sector was quite small. In 2014 
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the four British-headquarted companies among the largest firms were the oil company BP (no 6), 
the retailer Tesco (no 63), and the two banks HSBC and Lloyds (77 and 94, respectively) The 
largest manufacturing company was the Anglo-Dutch consumer products company Unilever, 
ranked 140 (Fortune 2014) 
It is within these radical shifts in the overall interpretation of what happened to British 
business from the nineteenth century that the role of business groups has surfaced. The first 
mention of business groups in the British business history literature was only in the 1990s (Jones, 
1994; Jones and Wale, 1998). However it is now well-understood that much British foreign 
direct investment (hereafter FDI) before 1914 was conducted by business groups which had a 
striking resemblance to the business groups found in Asia and Latin America today, debunking 
any view that they were the exclusive preserve of post-colonial developing countries. Much less 
research, however, has yet been done on the role, if any, of diversified business groups in the 
domestic economy. However this working paper shows that they were also not absent.  
For the sake of clarity, the following sections separate out the international and domestic 
stories of British business groups, while noting some commonalities in their growth and 
development.  
          
2. British Business Groups in Global Business: 1850-1970 
            From the mid-nineteenth century the world economy globalized. Thousands of firms, 
mostly based in Western countries which had experienced the Industrial Revolution, crossed 
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borders and established operations in foreign countries. In 1914 world FDI amounted to $14.6 
billion ($225 billion in 2015 US dollars), or the equivalent to 9 percent of world output, a ratio 
not seen again until the 1990s. Britain alone was the home economy of nearly one half of this 
FDI. (Jones, 1994; Jones 2005a; Dunning and Lundan, 2008)  
            British FDI took a variety of corporate forms. In manufacturing, modern-style 
multinationals were the dominant form. Firms such as Dunlop in rubber manufacturing and J & P 
Coats in cotton thread, first built businesses at home, and then established wholly-owned 
manufacturing affiliates in other European countries and/or the United States. They were single 
product firms. (Jones, 1986) In contrast, much FDI in natural resources and services took the 
form of large diversified business groups organized around core merchant houses or trading 
companies. (Jones, 2000; Jones and Colpan, 2010)  
British trading companies grew rapidly to exploit commercial links between their home 
country and the colonies as well as other developing countries. They perceived that large profits 
were to be earned from the exploitation of, and trade in, natural resources. The lack of 
infrastructure and local entrepreneurship in developing countries meant, first, that trading 
companies had to invest themselves rather than rely on others to create complementary 
businesses, and second that there were numerous profitable opportunities which could be 
exploited as the borders of the international economy and of empires advanced.  
               The general pattern of diversification before 1914 was from trade to related services 
such as insurance and shipping agencies, to FDI in resources, and processing in developing host 
economies. The British trading companies made the largest investments in tea, rubber and sugar 
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plantations, and teak. Chilean nitrates, Indian coal, and petroleum were also the recipients of 
considerable investment. As merchants, they were not especially interested in “locking up” 
capital in manufacturing, but they did make substantial investments in cotton textile and jute 
manufacture, sugar refining, and flour milling. 
          Multiple factors exercised systematic influences on the diversification strategies of the 
British trading companies in this era. The opportunities for scope economies and the incentive to 
reduce transactions costs is the first one. The boom in commodity prices in the first global 
economy created lucrative entrepreneurial opportunities. A third influence was the expansion of 
imperial frontiers which reduced the political risk of investing in Africa and Asia. (Jones, 2000) 
            Finally, and importantly, there was capital availability arising from Britain’s booming 
capital exports from the 1870s. As the merchant houses expanded, they floated on the stock 
exchange legally independent firms, subsequently described by the business historian Mira 
Wilkins as “free-standing firms, which they continued to control through small equity holdings, 
management contracts and other means in the established tradition of “agency houses”. (Wilkins, 
1988) They functioned, then, as venture capitalists identifying opportunities and placing 
potential British investors in touch with them.  
             Retrospectively, it might seem surprising that they could access equity. The legal 
structure for shareholders was not robust by later standards, as basic financial statements were 
unavailable even to shareholders and minority shareholder protection was inadequate. It was not 
until the Companies Act of 1929 that it was stipulated in the case of British public companies 
that balance sheets should be sent to all shareholders prior to the annual general meeting, and not 
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until 1948 that it stipulated that the profit and loss account also had to be circulated. However 
despite such information asymmetries, there were sufficient mitigating factors, including stock 
market regulations and extensive public financial information in the news media, to provide the 
assurances that enabled a large growth in individual share ownership. The number of individual 
investors on holding securities on the London Stock Exchange grew from 250,000 to one million 
between 1870 and 1914. There were also institutional investors, as commercial banks, insurance 
companies and investment trusts shifted their portfolios into stocks and shares. Overall Britain 
had by far the largest equity market in the world. (Cheffins, 2008; Michie, 1999). Insofar as 
companies engaged in commodities and other businesses in distant countries might be considered 
as particularly risky, the association of a reputable trading company with a new company 
provided some assurance to investors of honest and competent management. (Jones, 2000) 
               Table 1 shows the geographical spread of some of the larger British international 
business groups in 1914.  
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Table 1 Geographical Location and Parent Capital Employed of Selected Large British 
International Business Groups, 1913 
Parent Merchant 
House 
Estimated Capital 
Employed 
(£000s) 
Major Host Countries 
Regions 
Other Operations 
Jardine Matheson 2,500 China Japan;USA;South Africa; 
Peru 
Balfour 
Williamson 
2,000 Chile; USA Peru;Canada 
Wilson Sons & Co 1,728 Brazil; Argentina; UK Tunisia;Senegal; Egypt 
James Finlay 1,500 India; UK Ceylon;USA;Canada;Russia
Anthony Gibbs 1,500 Chile;Peru;Australia;UK USA 
Harrisons & 
Crosfield 
1,226 Malaya;Dutch East 
Indies;India 
Ceylon;USA: Canada; 
Australia; New Zealand 
Dodwell & Co 225 China;Canada;USA Ceylon;Japan 
Source: Jones (2000), pp. 54, 55, 58-61 
2.1. Organizational forms of international business groups           
                In the diversified business groups which emerged around the British merchant houses, 
the merchant house would act as the core firm within each group, usually responsible through its 
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overseas branches for trading and agency business, while separately quoted or incorporated 
affiliates — often not wholly owned — were engaged in plantations, mines, processing, and 
other non-trading operations. Consequently, although reinvested profits continued to be an 
important source of funds for the British merchant groups, after 1870 they also drew 
substantially on outside funds to finance expansion into new activities.  
                  There were several organizational forms. First, there were “unitary” business groups 
in which activities were wholly owned, although this did not mean that they were integrated in 
the sense of a modern corporation. A second, “network”, form consisted of a core trading 
company with multiple wholly owned branches surrounded by a cluster of partly owned firms 
linked not only by equity, but also debt, management, cross directorships, and trading 
relationships. Balfour Williamson was one example. It is this type that most resembles the 
business groups in today’s emerging economies. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the organizational 
structure of Balfour Williamson in 1914. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
Table 2.1 Balfour Williamson Group, 1914:Wholly-Owned Partnerships  
Wholly Owned 
Partnerships 
Country Date Opened Activities 
Balfour 
Williamson 
UK  1851 Head office 
Williamson 
Balfour 
Chile 1852 Selling and managing 
Williamson & Co. Chile 1911 Nitrates, grain milling
Milne & Co Peru 1912 Oil company agents 
Balfour Guthrie United States 1869 Selling, managing, 
land 
Balfour Guthrie Canada 1911 Trading fish, 
newsprint, wood pulp 
                 
Table 2.2 Balfour Williamson Group, 1914: Principal Affiliates 
Principal 
Affiliates 
Country of 
Registration 
Date Started % equity held by 
parent 
Activities 
Pacific Loan and 
Investment Co, 
UK 1878 Majority Mortgage loans; 
farms in 
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California 
Balfour Guthrie 
Investment 
USA 1889 Majority Investment 
company 
W.F. Stevenson Philippines 1904 25 Trading 
Lobitos Oilfields UK 1908 Minority Peruvian Oil 
Sociedad 
Comercial 
Harrington 
Morrison 
Chile 1910 75 Trading in north 
Chile 
West Coast Oil 
Fuel 
USA 1911 30 Oil storage in 
Chile  
Olympic 
Portland Cement 
UK 1911 1 Cement Plant, 
Washington 
state, USA 
Crown Mills 
Corporation 
USA 1911 100 Flour Mills, 
Portland, Oregon 
USA 
Santa Rosa 
Milling Co 
UK 1913 45 Flour Mills, 
Chile and Peru 
Sociedad 
Molinero de 
Osorno 
Chile 1913 100 Flour Mill, Chile 
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Source: Jones (2000), pp. 168-169. 
                   A variant of this type, which might be called a “loose network”, had no corporate 
core beyond family shareholdings.  This was the case of a cluster of trading and shipping firms 
owned by the Inchcape family, which only began to consolidate after 1948 (Munro 2003; Jones 
2000) 
              The choice of organizational form was determined in part by the business portfolios of 
companies. Trading operations and acting as agents for shipping, insurance, and manufacturing 
firms were generally internalized. These activities required either a large knowledge base on the 
part of firms, or the maintenance of a sound reputation among actual or potential clients. Trading 
companies whose business consisted primarily of trading and shipping agency and other agency 
work were mostly organized on a unitary basis. Within “network”-type business groups, these 
activities were also the responsibilities of wholly owned branches, but investments in plantations, 
mines and other diversified activities were typically placed in independent companies. Merchants 
made their profits from commissions on trade and agency business. As a result, they sought 
access to trade flows and information, and to prevent being denied access by being bypassed by 
parties they had brought together. Outright ownership of mines and plantations was, as a result, 
unnecessary as sufficient access was secured by non-equity modes.  
             If ownership of non-“core” activities could be shared, there were other advantages. It 
limited the risks of the parent trading companies, while enabling outside capital to be bought into 
ventures. This permitted the use of other people’s money to undertake entrepreneurial 
investments designed to generate new sources of income for them through commission and fees.  
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2.2. Competences and Longevity of International Business Groups 
            How can the competences of these business groups be assessed? Evidently they were 
initially the beneficiaries of a home country advantage. They developed at a time when Britain 
dominated world trade flows and, by the late nineteenth century, world capital flows. They were 
able to access the world’s largest equity markets. Many of their investments were located within 
the British Empire or parts of Latin America under British informal influence. In the interwar 
years the merchant firms were able to protect their business through extensive collusive cartels 
supported by the colonial authorities. Although Britain’s relative importance in the world 
economy began to decline from the late nineteenth century, the British trading companies in 
Asia, and Africa continued to benefit from the umbrella of British colonial rule through until the 
1950s and even later in the case of Hong Kong, Bermuda and other offshore financial territories 
including the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands.  
          The historical longevity of the trading companies in their host regions and the colonial 
status of many of these countries resulted in multiple “contacts” which provided a major 
competitive advantage. British colonial officials were frequently critical of the merchant firms, 
and certainly did not protect them against competitors. But if colonial administrations had their 
own agendas, they were still sufficiently close to the merchant firms in their ideological and 
cultural outlook to provide an immensely supportive context. However business groups also 
established long-standing “contacts” with local business elites in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
which gave them a “quasi-local” status.  They also had core competences centered on the areas 
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of knowledge, information, and external relationships. Management systems which involved 
staff spending their entire careers abroad generated extensive tacit knowledge about regions, 
products, and marketing channels. (Jones 2000; Jones and Colpan, 2010)            
           The constellation of firms around the trading companies were linked by  multiple 
institutional and contractual modes, with flows of managerial, financial, and trading relationships 
among those. The business groups possessed advantages related to imperfections in capital, 
labor, and product markets and in the area of property rights enforcement. There were numerous 
conflicts of interest and potential for opportunist behavior, but in practice rent-seeking was 
restrained. The external relationships surrounding the trading companies were also important 
elements of their architecture. These networks often relied on trust rather than contracts and were 
extremely durable. British merchants emerged from hubs such as London, Liverpool, and 
Glasgow and clustered in hubs overseas, and this provided one support for the high trust levels 
which facilitated such networks. Long-term relationships with banks provided a source of credit 
for routine operations, and support during crises. (Jones, 2000; Jones and Colpan, 2010) 
               The overall robustness of the business groups created before 1914 was demonstrated by 
their longevity. The subsequent decades were a difficult time for international business in the 
face of the exogenous shocks of world wars and the Great Depression, and the resulting policy 
responses in the shape of tariffs and exchange controls. After 1931 the global economy 
disintegrated. There was reduced diversification, yet most of the business groups persisted, 
sometimes because family and other shareholders were prepared to sustain companies paying 
low or no dividends. Many of the firms had all or most of their business within the sheltered 
confines of the British Empire. They sometimes still benefited from fiscal and other privileges 
16 
 
from colonial governments, while collusive cartels were permitted and usually supported. (Jones, 
2000) 
                After 1945 the British business groups continued to diversify and “reinvent” 
themselves. General and produce trading gave way to more specialized trading and sales 
agencies. Firms diversified geographically, while the Inchcape group relocated itself out of India 
towards the faster-growing and more open economies further east. New business groups 
emerged. After Tiny Rowland became chief executive of Lonrho, a company which began 
operating in Africa in 1909 as the London and Rhodesian Mining Company, he transformed the 
company into a major business group.  By 1995, Lonrho’s African non-mining businesses had 
expanded into 15 sub-Saharan African countries, with 90 operating companies involved in a 
wide range of business activities. 
               In the post-war decades, constraints were often more political than financial. Leaving 
aside such ‘havens’ as Hong Kong, where two important merchant houses established in the 
nineteenth century, John Swire and Jardine Matheson, were based, the general thrust of public 
policy in most developing host economies was to restrict or prohibit FDI, especially in natural 
resources and services. Among the most successful trading companies were firms which had 
suffered traumatic “shocks” as a result of the Pacific War and the Chinese revolution. The British 
merchants in the Far East and South East Asia acquired new premises and facilities which 
probably improved their efficiency compared with the prewar period, but more importantly their 
losses stimulated an entrepreneurial urge to rebuild and renew their businesses. Motivation of 
this type was lacking perhaps among the British business groups active in India and South 
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America, whose owners and managers seemed resigned to slow decline because of political 
hostility. 
             For the most part the basic organizational pattern of the network form of business groups 
as they had developed by the early twentieth century remained in place until at least the 1960s. 
The creation of new affiliate firms to undertake non-trading activities continued. After 1929, 
British exchange controls on investments outside the Sterling Area as well as the perceived risks 
of international investment effectively ended the flotation of new firms on the British capital 
markets. However well before then the trading companies had begun to make more use of locally 
registered firms or other types of institutional arrangement. The growing burden of British 
taxation on companies whose profits were earned largely abroad after World War 1 was initially 
an important consideration, and this led to the registration of several affiliated firms being 
shifted. It was really only in the 1960s that changes to this organizational form began to occur as 
improvements in corporate reporting and the emergence of organized capital markets in many 
countries meant that investors no longer needed the brand of a British trading company to 
guarantee that their savings would be “safe”. Indeed, complex groups with cross-shareholdings 
and internal transfers of commission and fees within the group looked less attractive as 
shareholders changed from being atomistic individuals to institutional investors (in Britain) or 
powerful business elites (in Asia and elsewhere). (Jones 2000) 
                The postwar fate of the business groups was in part correlated with their main host 
regions. Some host regions became hostile to foreign firms or imposed penal rates of taxation. 
This happened to the British business groups in South Asia and Latin America. East and South 
East Asia and West Africa, at least through to the 1970s,—offered much greater prospects. Hong 
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Kong from the 1950s, which combined fast economic growth with low taxes and a British legal 
system, offered especially favorable conditions. However strategic choices were possible. 
Swire’s and Jardine’s survived the loss of their Chinese investments in 1949. Inchcape and 
Booker McConnell both successfully escaped from “difficult” host countries to more attractive 
areas. And while overall political and economic conditions in Africa deteriorated from the 
perspective of Western firms from the 1960s, Lonrho developed as a large business group in this 
period. (Jones, 2000) 
               The fate of the business groups was also related to the stability of their shareholding 
structure. In a considerable number of cases, the decision by family shareholders to sell their 
shareholding was the catalyst which ended the independent existence and/or British ownership of 
firms. The development of a more fluid market for corporate control in Britain from the 1950s 
meant that the vulnerability of firms to takeover was much greater. (Jones, 2000) Regulatory 
changes, especially the London Stock Exchange’s 1967 code on take-overs which required any 
one acquiring 30 per cent of a listed firm to buy 100 per cent also made it much more difficult to 
retain a networked, or pyramidal, corporate structure. (Morck, 2009) 
                Against this background, in the 1970s especially, diversification strategies focused on 
“redeployment” from high-risk developing to developed countries such as the Commonwealth 
countries, including Britain, and the United States. In retrospect, it is apparent that British 
managements were prone to exaggerate the risks caused by political change in the developing 
world, while some firms also misjudged their core competences by acquiring firms in new 
industries and countries where they had no advantage and could add no value. Yet successful 
transitions were made from traders and plantation owners in developing economies to 
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manufacturers or distributors in developed countries. The British merchant houses in the Far East 
and South East Asia rose from the ashes of the wartime destruction of their assets and built 
vibrant new businesses, becoming large-scale automobile distributors and even the owner of a 
major airline in the case of Swire’s and Cathay Pacific. However, the British business groups in 
India and Latin America were notably unsuccessful in finding new strategies to fit changing 
circumstances.  
3. The Disappearance of the International Business Groups 
             During the 1980s the major British business groups continued to be quite successful. A 
study of the post-tax returns on net capital employed between 1980 and 1989 showed Booker at 
21.3 per cent; Inchcape 12.9 per cent; Swire’s 12.7 per cent; Jardine Matheson 10 per cent;  and 
Lonrho 9.2 per cent. The equivalent figures for BP were 12.1 per cent and Unilever 10.7 per 
cent. (Jones, 2000: 328) Yet by the following decade many of these long-standing business 
groups had begun to be transformed into focused food companies (Booker Group), automobile 
distributors (Inchcape), or chemical companies (Harrisons & Crosfield, now Elements). Of the 
surviving British trading companies, Swire’s and Jardine Matheson continued in business as 
large and ultimately British-controlled multinational business groups primarily active in Asia.          
          What caused the overall decline of most of these business groups? The first challenge 
arose from further changes in the economic and political environment of important host 
economies. Jardine Matheson and Swire have continued to draw enormous advantage from their 
position in Hong Kong. Conversely the fate of the giant United Africa Company (UAC), owned 
by Unilever, was all but sealed by the economic and political turbulence of the West African, and 
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especially the Nigerian, economies from the 1970s, as well as the growing level of corruption 
which was increasingly difficult for its parent Unilever to control. (Fieldhouse, 1994) In 
Malaysia and elsewhere, the British business groups were driven out by government 
determination to take local ownership of natural resources. (Yacob & Khalid, 2012).                                  
               Secondly, some business groups fell victim to failed attempts to diversify into regions 
and industries where they lacked expertise. Returns on capital employed in the 1990s fell at 
Inchcape, Swire’s and Lonrho, though they rose at Jardine Matheson and Harrison’s and 
Crosfield. The “merchant adventurer” ethos and the desire to escape from their traditional 
developing country hosts had led firms in some cases far away from core competences, however 
widely defined. During the 1980s many of these diversification strategies ran into great 
difficulties. The competence in region-specific knowledge and know-how was thus both a 
competitive advantage and a competitive disadvantage for the business groups, in that it provided 
a constraint on diversification options outside the host region. Extensive diversification outside 
“core” activities also proved to be detrimental thanks to the escalating costs from managerial 
constraints and diminishing benefits from the exploitation of established and proven expertise.   
           The final and the ultimate arbiter of the fate of the diversified business groups, however, 
was, however, the British capital markets. The capital markets which had made the creation of 
the diversified business groups possible before 1914 proved their nemesis from the 1980s. It was 
the declining share price of the publicly quoted firms which led to their ultimate demise as 
diversified trading companies. This was not due as a whole to poor performance, but rather of 
changed perceptions and priorities. The changed nature of British equity holders, which was 
different from before 1914 as individuals had been largely replaced by institutional investors 
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such as investment banks and pension funds by the 1980s, played a major role in that end. 
(Cheffins, 2008) While the individual shareholders before 1914—and indeed arguably through to 
the 1970s —were passive and often long-term holders of stock, the institutional investors that 
replaced them later on viewed shares increasingly as short-term investment vehicles. They were 
responsible to the owners of the funds that they invested, and as such had a duty to maximize 
investment returns. Consequently the main preoccupation of the institutions was short-term 
financial performance and share prices. Institutional investors held their own diversified 
portfolios, and since the 1980s preferred individual firms to focus on their “core” areas enabling 
their performance and prospects to be more efficiently monitored. (Jones 2000, Jones 2005b)  
             The language of “core competence” and “sticking to one’s knitting” began to  spread by 
business schools and management consultancies after 1980s, and in a sense became a self-
fulfilling prophecy which reduced the share prices of diversified firms in a way which the 
managers of publically quoted firms ignored at their peril. From the 1980s financial analysts 
became a major influence on corporate strategies. As Unilever, for example, discovered, they 
disliked complexity and acted as advocates of these fashionable management theories. (Jones, 
2005b: 347-351) Analysts and fund managers benchmarked against industrial categories to 
compare price/earnings ratios. Business groups, like the conglomerates discussed below, did not 
fit this model. The chairman of Inchcape in the mid-1990s noted: 
“I would not say the market was that confused about the businesses that Inchcape was in, but we 
were still seen as a bit of a conglomerate and conglomerates were completely out of fashion. 
Therefore, the market just refused to accept the intrinsic value of the company.” (Butler and 
Keary, 2000: 300). 
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         The ultimate family control of Swire’s and Jardine Matheson ensured their survival. Both 
firms were sheltered from hostile host governmental pressures for localization during the 1980s, 
as the laissez-faire British colonial government in Hong Kong shared none of the protectionist 
and nationalistic sentiments of its neighbors in South Korea and Taiwan. The controlling families 
also took steps to consolidate their ownership of their multiple affiliates in response to occasional 
attempts by outside groups to take large equity stakes. As early as 1974 Swire placed most of its 
Hong Kong affiliates into a partly owned but publicly quoted (in Hong Kong) holding company, 
Swire Pacific, which in turn held equity in the principal affiliates, including Cathay Pacific and 
Swire Properties. At that time John Swire & Sons directly held 50 per cent of the China 
Navigation Company, the major shipping subsidiary which was British-registered, and in 1976 
the firm acquired the remaining 50 per cent of the equity. Most of the other affiliates remained 
partly owned, different classes of shareholding meaning that full control remained in the hands 
of John Swire & Sons, itself still wholly owned by the founding families. John Swire & Sons 
employed 122,000 persons in 2014. 
          Swire’s “twin”, Jardine Matheson, employed 240,000 persons by 2014, and controlled 
businesses with $61.5 billion in revenues. The firm’s interests ranged from the Mandarin 
Oriental hotel chain in Hong Kong to property development in China, supermarkets, 
construction, and car dealership. It owned more than half of Astra, the largest listed company in 
Indonesia, which itself has more than 170 companies. Jardine Matheson was noted for opaque 
governance and complex organizational arrangements. In 1984, following the announcement that 
Britain would return China to Hong Kong in 1997, it moved its domicile from Hong Kong to 
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Bermuda. Ten years later, after Hong Kong refused to allow Jardine Matheson to use the 
protective takeover code of Bermuda, Jardine Matheson  relisted its companies in Singapore. 
4. Business Groups and Domestic Business in Britain: 1850-1970 
              The diversified business group organizational form was found much less frequently in 
British domestic business. The well-developed capital markets and the commercial banking 
system allowed single product firms, as the capital-intensity of industries at that time were not 
great. As firms grew in size, there were large-scale merger movements from the late nineteenth 
century. These were primarily horizontal. The fragmented cotton textiles industry, for example, 
saw numerous mergers: textiles accounted for 330 of the 895 firms affected by mergers between 
1887 and 1900.(Hannah, 1976: 22) The Calico Printers' Association Ltd was formed in 1899 
from the amalgamation of 46 textile printing companies and 13 textile merchants. The company 
at its inception accounted for over 80 per cent of Britain’s output of printed cloth. In cotton 
thread, Britain’s largest cotton thread producer J & P Coats went public in 1890, and six years 
later acquired four large competitors to create Britain’s largest industrial firm. Other mergers 
created the Salt Union, controlling 90 per cent of the domestic market, Associated Portland 
Cement (45 per cent of the market), Imperial Tobacco (90 per cent) and Distillers (75 per cent of 
the whiskey market).  
         These firms sometimes did not closely integrate merged firms, which were often managed 
as independent fiefdoms. In the literature they have often been described as federations of many 
specialized companies loosely presided over by holding companies, which were frequently 
dominated by families and concentrated on certain industries. Imperial Tobacco, for example, 
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remained a federation of family firms with little central direction. (Hannah, 1980: 53) In textiles, 
the leading firms Calico Printers Association, Bradford Dyers, and Fine Spinners and Doublers 
were seen by Chandler as characteristically loose federations of firms throughout the interwar 
years, although Hannah has recently denounced this view as one of Chandler’s many “grotesque 
misclassifications” of British business history. In the case of Calico Printers, Hannah notes, the 
inefficient management organization was corrected within two years of the firm’s formation. 
(Hannah, 2009: 33). 
           This dominance of specialist companies in the domestic economy contrasts with the 
unrelated diversification seen in some economies in Europe, and indeed with the British-based 
international trading companies. Compared to other countries at the time, institutional voids in 
financial and trading markets were low. The large equity market made it relatively easy and 
cheap for companies to raise capital. Whatever the risks arising from informational asymmetries, 
there was a large demand for shares, not least because shares in British-based companies 
outperformed returns in government bonds 34 out of the 43 years before 1914. Many local 
industrial companies floated their shares on provincial stock exchanges where knowledge about 
the individuals involved and the industry was well-known, greatly reducing the need for formal 
disclosure in company documents and annual reports. (Cheffins, 2008:205-220) Commodity 
markets were as well developed as financial markets. 
              The domestic market was compact and high income, and many firms were also prolific 
exporters in the highly globalized British economy. Absent any anti-trust legislation before 1948, 
specialist combinations could exercise substantial market power in their industries, so the 
financial incentives for unrelated diversification were hardly compelling, even if it was 
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theoretically possible that they could reinvest the money earned from such monopolies to grow 
in unrelated industries. While international trading companies formed the core of the overseas 
business groups, Britain’s domestic banking system, which had become highly concentrated by 
1914, did not provide an equivalent organizing driver for domestic business groups. In the highly 
developed and specialized British financial system, the equity and bond markets were perceived 
as the appropriate source of long-term funding, while the commercial banks provided short-term 
financial accommodation.  This was the strong preference of the Bank of England also which 
promoted market-type relationships between banks and industries. Unlike bank-orientated 
economies such as Germany or Sweden, British banks did not take or hold large equity stakes in 
industrial firms, then, but instead focused on the provision of short-term finance or the floating 
of stock. It was striking that even for larger enterprises capital came from many sources, 
including re-invested profits, stock market issues, private placements with stockbrokers and 
insurance companies, and family. (Hannah, 1980:55)  
              The handful of business groups which did emerge typically had substantial international 
businesses, and purposeful entrepreneurial founders. A large group developed around the 
engineering contractor Weetman Pearson, which became one of the longest-lasting of such 
businesses in Britain.  This began as a purely domestic business, but from the 1880s Pearson 
developed his business into a global contractor, undertaking massive infrastructure projects in 
the United States and Mexico. In 1901, he also began securing large oil concessions, and in 1909 
found a hugely prolific oil well. Initially the main corporate vehicle was the contracting firm S. 
Pearson and Sons Ltd. After the discovery of oil, however, the Mexican oil assets were put into 
the Mexican-registered company Mexican Eagle Oil Company which had a primary listing in 
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Mexico and a secondary listing in London. In 1912 the Eagle Oil Transport Co was registered in 
Britain to control the transportation and distribution of oil outside Mexico. Another British 
company, Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Company, marketed oil outside Mexico. A fourth 
company, Whitehall Securities Corporation, was founded in 1908 to manage S. Pearson and 
Son’s other investments. Weetman Pearson closely controlled S. Pearson and Sons, which 
wholly-owned Whitehall Securities. Mexican Eagle had substantial outside shareholders in 
Mexico and Britain. Eagle Oil’s ordinary shares were owned fifty/fifty by Mexican Eagle and S. 
Pearson, but the preference shares were listed. Anglo-Mexican was a private company. A recent 
study has estimated the market value of the entire group in 1919 at £79 million, which would 
have made it Britain’s largest business. (Bud-Frierman, Godley, and Wale, 2010;  Garner 2011;  
Spender, 1930). 
             Pearson sold the Mexican oil business in 1919, but the business group expanded and 
continued to diversify both internationally and domestically. In Mexico and Chile it retained 
substantial electricity and tramway businesses, which were consolidated into a private British 
company Whitehall Electric Investments Ltd. in 1922.  These were sold seven years later, but the 
company established new electricity businesses in Britain, and between 1925 and 1970 operated 
electricity and tramway business in Athens, Greece. It also established a new company, 
Amerada, for oil production in the United States. Although this was sequestrated by the British 
government during World War II, subsequently other oil investments were made in the United 
States and Canada. In 1969 these were rolled into a US oil company Ashland Oil and Refining 
Company, in which Pearson held a substantial equity stake.  In 1919, the firm acquired a 45 per 
cent stake in the London branch of merchant bankers Lazard Brothers, and this became a 
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majority stake in 1932.  In 1921, Pearson purchased a number of local newspapers in Britain, 
which it combined to form the Westminster Press. This became the basis of a large publishing 
group. In 1957, the Group bought the Financial Times and acquired a 50% stake in The 
Economist. It purchased the publisher Longman in 1968. Meanwhile in the early 1950s it 
acquired the Lawley Group, manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers of china and glass in 
Britain. Further acquisitions led in 1964 to formation of Allied English Potteries. During the 
1960s the firm also bought a large shareholding in the French wine maker Château Latour. 
Pearson remained a family owned private company until 1969, when it floated 20 per cent of its 
equity on the London Stock Exchange and became a public listed company. It had five divisions 
of roughly equal profit contribution; banking and finance, investment trusts, newspapers and 
publishing, oil, and industrial. Table 3 lists the principal activities of the Group in 1969.  
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Table 3 Pearson Group, c1969 
Company Name Sector % Shareholding by Parent 
Whitehall Securities Management and Financial 
Services 
100 
Lazard Brothers Investment Bank 80 
S. Pearson Publishers Newspapers, Financial Times 51 
Westminster Press Provincial British newspapers 51 
Longman Group Book publishing Majority 
Ashland Oil Oil and chemical  production, 
transport and distribution in 
US, Canada, Indonesia, 
Brunei, Ghana 
Minority 
Standard Industrial Group UK manufacturing, including 
pottery, glass, engineering 
59 
Château Latour French wines Majority 
Athens Pireas Electric 
Railways 
Athens trolley services Majority 
Sources; Hill (1985), Whittington and Mayer (2000); http://timeline.pearson.com; 
http://www.gracesguide.co.uk/S._Pearson_and_Son 
                Pearson diversified much further after the  public flotation, buying the famous London 
wax museum Madam Tussauds, amusement parks, investing in satellite broadcasting and much 
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more. The Cowdray family trust retained a large, although no longer controlling, shareholding 
through the 1980s, and a family member remained as chairman as late as 1997. The 
diversification and the family investment, by then, made the business “an anomaly on the British 
scene,” albeit one that did not prevent it running large and successful businesses, including being 
“one of the world’s leading financial publishers” (Whittington and Mayer, 2000, pp. 100-101; 
Hill, 1985).  It was only in the late 1990s that diversification began to be unraveled, as financial 
analysts and markets increasing looked with disfavor on unrelated diversification. Madam 
Tussauds was sold in 1998, and the shareholding in the merchant bank Lazards in 2000. The 
company focused on educational publishing, newspapers and the media. In 2000 Pearson spent 
$2.5 billion to acquire NCS, the largest American school testing company, and within a decade 
controlled three fifths of the U.S. testing market. Overall by 2015 Pearson had revenues of $8 
billion, 60 per cent of which were earned in the United States, and was the world’s largest 
educational publisher. (Reingold, 2015). It was only in that year that Pearson divested its 
ownership of the Financial Times and The Economist. 
                Overall, during the post-World War II period the structure of British business changed 
radically. Family firms and family directors slowly disappeared. (Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 
2005) Concentration increased at a rapid pace during the 1950s and 1960s with major merger 
waves.  Large British companies adopted the M-form, frequently as a result of employing the 
services of management consultants, notably McKinsey. Channon's study traced the evolution of 
the M-form of organization for a sample of the ninety-two largest British companies from 1950 
to 1970 (and ninety-six companies for the period 1960-1970). In 1950 he found only twelve 
companies in his sample had adopted a multidivisional structure. By the end of the 1950s some 
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30 percent of the firms in the sample had such a structure, and by 1970 the M-form was the 
dominant organizational form, with sixty-eight of the ninety-six sample large British 
corporations adopting it. The spread of the M-form signaled the rapid expansion of product 
diversification in large British companies. By 1970 the M-form was almost as widespread in 
Britain as in the United States, while M-form had been more widely adopted in Britain than in 
any other large European economy. (Channon, 1973; Jones, 1997)  Arguably that form served as 
a pre-condition for the growth of conglomerates. 
5. The Rise and Fall of Conglomerates: 1970 to the Present 
5.1. The Growth of Conglomerates   
          Table 4 shows the rapid rise in the share of unrelated diversified firms in the top 200 
industrial firms in Britain between 1970 and 1993. 
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Table 4 Diversification of Top 100 Industrial Firms in Britain (%) 
 1950 1970 1983 1993 
Single Product 24 6 7 5 
Dominant 
Product 
50 32 16 10 
Related 
Diversified 
27 57 67 61 
Unrelated 
Diversified 
- 6 11 24 
Source: Whittington and Mayer (2000), p.139 
                 The growth of acquisitive conglomerates occurred in several waves. During the 
postwar decades a number of highly diversified conglomerates emerged, including Sears, Slater 
Walker, Thomas Tilling, and Reckitt and Coleman. The Rank Organization was particularly 
interesting. In 1937, Joseph Arthur Rank formed The Rank Organisation, bringing together a 
number of motion picture businesses acquired in previous years, including Pinewood Studios and 
Denham Films. Subsequently he added the Odeon chain of cinemas, the Gaumont-British Picture 
Corporation and the noted film studios at Elstree and Lime Grove. During the 1940s and 1950s, 
the Rank Organisation produced numerous films, but also engaged in unrelated diversification. 
In 1956, Rank entered into a joint venture with the Haloid Corporation of the USA to 
manufacture and market photocopying equipment under the name Rank Haloid. The company, 
which subsequently became known as Rank Xerox, was hugely successful (Rank finally sold its 
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share in 1997). Rank also owned a record company, Top Rank Records (sold in 1960 to EMI) 
and manufactured radios and televisions through Rank Bush Murphy Group (sold in 1978 to 
Great Universal Stores). During the 1980s and 1990s Rank made numerous acquisitions in 
leisure retail sector, including theme parks, pubs, restaurants, nightclubs, hotels, holiday camps, 
timeshare developments and camping grounds as well as bingo clubs and casinos. The Company 
owned a portfolio of famous leisure brands including Butlin’s holiday camps, Odeon cinemas 
and Hard Rock Café; and was associated with Universal Studios in theme park joint ventures in 
Florida and Osaka, Japan. (Whittington and Mayer, 2000; Channon 1973: 62-3, 188-192)  
             The real momentum in the growth of the conglomerates began in the 1960s, and was 
intensified in 1970s. It was enabled by the fluid market for corporate control which had opened 
up after Sigmund Warburg had introduced the concept of the hostile takeover when he facilitated 
the takeover of British Aluminum in 1956. (Ferguson, 2011: 183-199) During the 1960s the 
tightly regulated British financial system began to be liberalized, enabling a new range of 
funding opportunities for acquisitions as the subsequent decade of oil price hikes and extensive 
industrial strikes weakened long-established firms. They were also weakened by high inflation, 
while rapidly rising price levels also facilitated the claims of conglomerates to be able to turn 
around poorly performing firms, as nominal revenues rose sharply.  
           A new type of financier emerged, engaged in buying and selling companies, and taking 
advantage of the internationalized financial system. High profile figures included “Jimmy” 
Goldsmith, who with the financial backing of Isaac Wolfson, bought up a series of bakeries in 
1965 and founded Cavenham Foods. He used this a vehicle to buy and asset-strip established 
firms like Bovril, using a network of private companies and the Cayman Islands-registered 
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General Oriental Investments, and allied with the controversial finance house Slater, Walker, 
which eventually went bankrupt in 1975. Although Goldsmith sold many of his diversified 
investments in the early 1980s, he was immortalized as the distasteful British financier Sir 
Lawrence Wildman in the classic Hollywood movie Wall Street in 1987. Meanwhile the 1980s 
with deregulation and liberalization in full swing under Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in the 
United States, there were many acquisition opportunities for other “corporate raiders” who could 
finance acquisitions by borrowing from the financial markets and banks, and maintained a self-
sustaining earnings growth by the constant accumulation of companies.  
               Hanson Trust was a classic example. James Hanson, the scion of a long-established 
family business, and Gordon White, built Hanson Trust into Britain’s ninth largest company by 
the early 1990s with sales of £10 billion. It started in 1964 when James Hanson and Gordon 
White set up a small company called Welbecson which imported greetings cards from the United 
States. In the following year they took over Wiles Group, a small animal by-products company, 
sack hire and fertilizer firm, and in 1968 bought a brick maker called Butterley. Hanson Trust 
was formed in 1969. White settled in New York in 1973 and started building a US business, but 
Hanson Trust remained a modest affair until the takeover of a struggling British company called 
Lindustries, which made locks, safes and security equipment, in 1979. There followed a swathe 
of large acquisitions including the battery maker Berec, the renamed British Eveready in 1982, 
the Imperial Group in 1986, and Quantum, an American plastics specialist, in 1993. The Imperial 
Group was bought in 1986 for £2.5 billion, of which Hanson recouped £2.4 billion in subsequent 
asset sales, leaving Hanson in control of Imperial's large and profitable tobacco operations. 
Hanson's activities came to include tobacco products, forest products, coal mining, chemicals, 
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and bricks and construction. Hanson was closely connected to the Conservative Party, which 
ruled Britain under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher during the 1980s, and was made a Lord in 
1983. (Brummer and Cowe, 1994)   
               Hanson grew using a simple business model: buy asset-rich companies, often in low-
risk stable industries such as cigarettes and bricks, with good cash flows and manage them for 
cash and return on capital. The business was almost entirely based in Britain and United States, 
reflecting the active markets for corporate control which made acquisitions and asset stripping 
far easier than in Continental Europe or elsewhere. A key feature of the business model was the 
payment of as little tax as possible. Until a change in British tax laws in 1987, Hanson employed 
the device of dual-resident companies – incorporated in the United States but with a trading 
address in Britain – which enabled the venture to claim tax relief on interest payments in both 
countries. During the 1980s Hanson had up to twenty companies incorporated in the tax haven of 
Panama, through which many transactions passed. It was further more complicated in its 
structure than the usually-assumed conglomerates that wholly owned their subsidiaries. For 
instance, Kidde, an acquired business of Hanson in 1987, was not only retained as an entity, but 
it was owned by numerous other Hanson entities, all of them private, and many registered 
outside the UK. As Figure 1 shows, the ultimate owner, Hanson Trust, was several tiers distant in 
ownership terms. (Brummer and Cowe, 1994) 
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Figure 1. Ownership and control of a Hanson Trust subsidiary, Kidde, in 1987  
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Source: Redrawn based on Brummer and Cowe, Appendix 5, p. 319.  
             BAT (British American Tobacco) grew out of a single product firm making tobacco 
products. In 1952 it acquired the paper manufacturer Wiggins-Teape. In 1964 it ventured into 
entirely new pastures when it acquired both an ice cream company and a one-third stake in the 
Lenthéric fragrance house, which became wholly-owned within three years. While the ice cream 
company was divested within four years, BAT’s adventures in beauty proved to be more 
sustained. Over the following two decades BAT spent $120 million acquiring small and medium-
sized cosmetics and fragrances businesses, usually from the descendants of founding families. 
Acquisitions included Morney (1966), Yardley (1967), and US-based Germaine Monteil (1969), 
all of which owned well-established brands which had become tired. During the 1970s major 
investments in retail were made including the Argos catalogue chain and the Marshall Field’s 
department stores in the United States. In 1984 financial services were added when the firms 
acquired Eagle Star insurance, followed by Allied Dunbar and Farmers in the United States. 
Whittington and Mayer, 2000: 141)       
                 BTR grew rapidly from the 1970s from a modest firm in the rubber industry to a 
diversified industrial conglomerate. This growth was based on a series of acquisitions of once-
famous names in British industry, including Thomas Tilling in 1983, Dunlop in 1985, and 
Hawker Sidde1ey in 1991. By then the firm had sales of $11.3 billion, operated 600 plants 
worldwide and had subsidiaries in 24 countries, and was one of the ten largest companies on the 
London Stock Exchange. (Elderkin, 1997, Jones 1997)       
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          To some (at the time and subsequently) these conglomerates represented the worst 
excesses of “financial capitalism.” They adopted a particularly decentralized form of organ-
ization. Headquarters were often primarily concerned with financial matters; in other matters, 
managers in divisions were given considerable autonomy, with most production and sales 
decisions delegated to subsidiaries. While supporters of such conglomerates pointed to their role 
in disciplining inefficient managements, their critics questioned both their interest in, and their 
ability to sustain, long-term strategies centered on innovation rather than the payment of high 
dividends to shareholders.  
4.2. Capabilities and the Decline of the Conglomerates  
            The fact that from the late 1990s many of the conglomerates were unwound would 
support such a view that their organizational capabilities were not sustainable. BAT sold off its 
diversified businesses. In 1996 Hanson broke itself up into four separate companies focused on 
tobacco, chemicals, energy, and building materials. In the same period BTR sold off many 
peripheral activities and restructured itself around four principal global product groups in which 
the firm held an advantage, either in superior technology or low cost production. In 1999 it 
merged with Siebe to form  Invensys. It subsequently went through years of divestments to avoid 
bankruptcy, restructured as an engineering and information technology company, and was 
acquired by France’s Schneider in 2013. 
                   However the view that the conglomerates were dismantled because they were 
inherently inefficient, although frequently asserted, is not entirely convincing for several reasons. 
First, Whittington and Mayer have shown that the financial performance of unrelated diversified 
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firms in aggregate was quite good. Indeed, the financial performance of individual firms was 
impressive. BTR, for example, started the 1980s with a return on equity of 21.5 per cent and 
ended it with an even higher return of 39.3 per cent as it expanded its level of diversification 
(Whittington and Mayer, 2000: 150-153) In Cassis’s study of the profitability of British, French 
and German companies for 1987-89, Hanson impressively tops the list of the most profitable 
British industrial companies with a rate of return of 54.1 per cent, although the use of complex 
accounting measures raise some questions about the nature of these earnings: BTR was in third 
place with 36.2 per cent, and another conglomerate, Grand Metropolitan seventh with 28.7 per 
cent. Hanson and BTR were impressively more profitable than any German or French industrial 
company in his list. (Cassis 1997:99)  
                  Second, individual case studies point towards real managerial capabilities. Take the 
apparently odd case of the BAT’s acquisitions of small cosmetics and fragrance firms. In 1970 
the individual acquisitions were merged into a single subsidiary, British American Cosmetics. A 
former Procter & Gamble manager was recruited as managing director. He hired managers from 
other consumer products companies, rather than the tobacco parent. However synergies were 
achieved with other parts of the BAT group; in particular, information was shared about 
consumer marketing and retailing trends at group-wide training sessions. Over two decades a 
substantial and well-managed business was created out of what had been a random collected of 
tired brands. There was substantial innovation. Lentheric successfully developed a mass market 
fragrance business sold through drugstores, and became a market leader in Britain by 1977. BAC 
slowly grew its business through further acquisitions, although the small size of the business 
compared to its parent meant that there was a constant struggle to get funds. During the early 
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1980s a major restructuring of Yardley, its merger with the more successful Lentheric business, 
and the creation of a worldwide marketing operation, created a viable and profitable company.  
              By 1984 BAC was the largest British-owned cosmetics firm, if still a modest player in 
world terms, which manufactured in 37 countries and sold in over 140, with a product range 
which spanned fragrances, men’s products, luxury toiletries, make-up and skin care products. 
The sale of the business in that year was not because it had failed, but because BAT had other 
priorities. Beauty products never exceeded 2 per cent of overall corporate revenues, one per cent 
of the profits, of what had become Britain’s third largest company by the 1980s. As BAT shifted 
into financial services, BAC simply did not fit. (Jones 2010: 253-4)   
          Third, it is noteworthy that the conglomerates left substantive legacies. Take Hanson 
Trust.  This company certainly ran into trouble in the early 1990s through a poorly-managed 
hostile acquisition attempt at the chemical company ICI. The purchase of this firm would have 
made Hanson the biggest British company, and secured the hidden jewel within ICI, the 
pharmaceuticals business that would later become Zeneca. ICI’s management, advised by 
investment bank Goldman Sachs, responded astutely by unearthing some embarrassing facts 
about Hanson, such the millions of dollars squandered on racehorses by Gordon White. The 
company’s well-deserved aura of maximizing shareholder value was damaged, the company no 
longer looked like the shareholders' friend, and the whole episode sparked skepticism about the 
value of the Hanson corporate structure. Yet the successor businesses survived for some time 
when the firm broke itself up in 1996. The Hanson name went with the building materials 
company and continued until 2007, when it was acquired by a large German cement company, 
which ten years later sold to a US private equity firm.  And the quality of its management cadre 
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was demonstrated by the numerous Hanson alumni in senior positions in British industry over 
the following decade. (Pratley, 2004) 
               The plausible explanation for the winding up of many of the conglomerates is the same 
capital market pressures which ended the diversified international business groups: they were 
simply unfashionable and their share prices came under pressure as a result. Unfashionability 
resulted in low ratings which raised the cost of capital. Among other things, this made it 
increasingly hard to find acquisitions could maintain earnings growth. This particularly disrupted 
the business model of the conglomerates which rested on acquisitions. As the cases of Berkshire 
Hathaway, News International and GE in the United States showed, stellar returns and 
charismatic leadership could enable the bullet of the conglomerate discount to be dodged. 
However the British conglomerates only seem to have made very financial returns rather than 
stellar ones, and they were short of charismatic chief executives. Lord Hanson came closest in 
that regard, but the failed ICI acquisition and the horse-racing scandal wrecked his aura of 
success. 
            In contrast, the Virgin Group had charismatic leadership, and developed and survived as 
a diversified business group, holding majority and minority stakes in its companies. The group 
originated when the 15-year old Richard Branson established a student magazine in 1965. This 
finally failed, but provided the launch pad for a mail order record business that soon expanded 
into Virgin Megastore, a chain of popular record stores in Britain. Virgin Records, a lucrative 
music production business was launched in 1973. In 1984 Branson launched Virgin Atlantic, 
initially offering a service between London and New York that offered “first class tickets at 
business-class prices.” The Virgin Group went public in 1987, but Branson soon realized that the 
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British capital markets were already struggling to understand highly diversified businesses. He 
took the business private again in 1988.Branson sold the very profitable Virgin Records in 1992, 
and used the money to expand into new small ventures, including Virgin Cola, Virgin Brides, 
Virgin Clothing and Virgin Cosmetics. Many failed. There was further diversification in 
transport. In 1997 Virgin took over the franchise of part of Britain’s rail system and launched 
Virgin Trains, and in 2000 launched the Australian airline Virgin Blue. The group entered 
financial services in 1995 when it partnered with an insurance company to create Virgin Direct. 
In 1998 Virgin backed a start-up team in the health and fitness sector to launch Virgin Active. In 
1999 it launched Virgin Mobile, the first British virtual cell phone network operator. Typically, 
Virgin’s start-up model involved the use of private financing alongside another equity investor, 
combined with a large amount of debt to Virgin Group Holdings, the parent holding company. 
(Gordon 2014) 
           The Virgin Group was organized in a hierarchical structure but with some especially 
distinctive features. In 2014 at least 80 companies had the Virgin name, and a small number of 
them, including Virgin Atlantic and Virgin Media were large businesses. Virgin Group Holdings, 
whose portfolio was valued at more than £5 billion (US $7.5 billion) in 2014, fully owned only a 
few of the companies. The Holdings were run on a private equity model, employing cash or 
stakes in other firms to support the growth of other Virgin branded businesses. (Gordon, 2014) It 
held both majority and minority shares in Virgin companies, while other companies were joint 
ventures. Most of the companies in the portfolio were private, although some like the Australian 
airline Virgin Australia were publicly listed. Some companies, such as most of the Virgin Mobile 
companies, were linked to the Group only by a licensing agreement, as Branson had sold all the 
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equity. Virgin Mobile Canada, for example, was owned by Bell, and Virgin Mobile Australia 
was owned by Optus. Virgin controlled the operating companies primarily by having people on 
their boards and through licensing agreements which stipulated the terms and conditions of the 
use of the brand.  (MacCormack, 2001;Pisano and Corsi, 2012)  Table 5 lists the 12 largest 
Virgin companies by revenues in 2014 and gives their relationship to Virgin Group Holdings. 
Table 5  Largest Virgin Companies and relationship to Virgin Group Holdings, 2014. 
Virgin Company Annual Revenues (£ million)  Virgin Group Holding share of 
equity (%) 
Virgin Media 4,300 0. Royalty income only 
Virgin Australia 2,600 10 
Virgin Atlantic 2,600 51 
Virgin Mobile USA 1,300 0 Royalty income only 
Virgin Trains 946 51 
Virgin America 911 22 
Virgin Active 631 48 
Virgin Holidays 535 Owned by Virgin Atlantic 
Virgin Mobile France 362 50 
Virgin Mobile Canada 359 0 Royalty income only 
Virgin Mobile Australia 343 0 Royalty income Only 
Virgin Money UK 299 47 
Source: Gordon (2014) 
43 
 
 
                It remains challenging to describe either the performance or the capabilities of Virgin, 
as the Group was opaque. The business was intimately connected to the charismatic founder 
Richard Branson and a brand that symbolized fun, innovation, rebellion, value for money and 
good customer service. In an interesting twist on organizational design, the brand identity served 
as the primary means of co-ordinating disparate companies. The Virgin brand also played an 
important role in recruiting management talent, as the Group was considered an attractive place 
to work. (Pisano and Corsi, 2012: 8) There were also less flattering explanations of the corporate 
capabilities which were hard to either prove or disprove. As in the case of other business groups 
and conglomerates with powerful founder entrepreneurs, such as Tiny Rowland and Lonrho and 
Rupert Murdoch and News Corporation, there were unproven allegations by some investigative 
journalists that Virgin’s growth rested on actions some might consider as ethically challenging. 
(Bower, 2008)        
                 It is also possible to see the private equity industry in Britain as a successor to the 
conglomerates. While the two models differ radically in some respects, including the former’s 
use of independent funds organized as limited partnerships to carry out buyouts rather than 
holding direct ownership stakes, they also share considerable similarities, including the use of 
acquisitions and unrelated diversification, and perhaps even, as Cheffins and Armour suggest, “a 
capacity for capturing the public imagination.” (Cheffins and Armour, 2007:27)  The industry 
association claimed that Britain in 2015 was  “one of the leading centers for private equity in the 
world.” (http://www.bvca.co.uk/AboutUs.aspx, accessed February 15 2015) The largest houses 
included Apax Partners, which traced its history back to Patricof & Co. founded in 1969, Permira 
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(founded 1985), Alchemy Partners (founded 1997), and Phoenix Equity (founded 2001).  In 2015 
these four ventures had funds under management of  $40 billion, $22 billion, $2.2 billion and 
$1.3 billion respectively. However the industry lacked the legitimacy of its American 
counterpart, and was subject to a British public enquiry in 2007 (Cheffins, 2008: 397-401; De 
Cock and Nyberg, 2014). The British firms also struggled with serious funding and other issues 
after the 2008 financial crisis (Ebrahimi,  2013). It remained too soon to tell whether British-
based private equity firms would recover their dynamism, or eventually follow the path of their 
predecessors, the conglomerates. 
6. Conclusions 
             This working paper has explored the prevalence of business groups, often assumed to be 
primarily an emerging market phenomenon,  in the business history of Britain since 1850. It 
shows that this form of business organization was by no means been entirely absent, even though 
the country did not fit the pattern of institutional voids and rent-seeking from autocratic 
governments frequently associated with the prevalence of business groups in emerging markets                
          During the second half of the nineteenth century, British merchant houses established 
business groups with diversified portfolio and pyramidal structures overseas, primarily in 
developing countries, both colonial and independent. These business groups were often resilient 
and successful until the late twentieth century. A number, especially Swires and Jardine 
Matheson, survive today, albeit with their public companies quoted on stock markets outside 
Britain. In contrast, in the domestic economy, the business group form had a more limited role. 
Large single product firms were the norm, which over time merged into large combines with 
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significant market power. This reflected a business system in which a close relationship between 
finance and industry was discouraged, but there were few restrictions on the transfer of corporate 
ownership. Yet some large diversified business groups did develop, typically with substantial 
international businesses. After World War II, and especially between the 1970s and the 1990s, 
diversified conglomerates also flourished. Typically both the diversified business groups and the 
conglomerates were the creation of dynamic entrepreneurs, whether Weetman Pearson, Richard 
Branson or James Hanson, which developed private or closely held shareholding structures 
which were resistant to the market for corporate control.   
              This evidence presented here suggests that diversified business groups can add value in 
mature markets such as Britain. They proved a successful and flexible organizational form for 
conducting international business over a long period. In the domestic economy, Pearson and 
Virgin created well-managed and performing businesses over decades. The much-criticized 
acquisitive conglomerates were also quite financially successful forms of business enterprise. 
While capable of major missteps, the demise of many of them appears to owe at least as much to 
management fads as to serious under-performance.       
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